Donald Trump’s presidential election victory has prompted speculation about what it will mean for Libya. While some hope it will greater engagement by Washington — with some claiming that he will rally behind Khalifa Haftar — the general consensus is that Libya will slip further off America’s agenda under Trump’s watch. 

Not that President Joe Biden’s Administration has been especially Libya-focused. The recent greater efforts to engage on the military front — including an attempt to professionalise some of the armed groups in western Libya — has been more driven by fear of Russian forces operating in Libya and the Sahel than any clear attempt to resolve the political and security crisis. The Administration has also worked hard to try to resolve the economic crisis, particularly in relation to the unified budget and the Central Bank of Libya (CBL). However, this is no substitute for a wider effort to resolve the crisis. Moreover, the US still does not have an ambassador to Libya with the post having been vacant since 2022. 

However, with Trump’s isolationist stance, it seems very unlikely that his new administration will focus much attention on Libya or the wider North Africa region. Some analysts have suggested that this could open the way for Italy to play an even larger role.

Rome is obviously already heavily engaged in Libya and this month Prime Minister, Giorgia Meloni made her fourth trip to Tripoli since taking office. She attended the Italy-Libya Business Forum, where she promoted the Mattei Plan, which seeks to strengthen Italy’s role in Africa through energy security and economic projects. The visit triggered rumours that she was in Tripoli to facilitate the signing of the controversial NC7 Hamada deal between Eni and the National Oil Corporation (NOC). This prompted some MPs in the House, as well as the ousted GNU Oil and Gas Minister, Mohamed Oun, to call for negotiations with foreign companies over the field to be stopped. 

Besides this. some commentators believe that Trump’s election presents an opportunity for Italy to enhance its role in Libya. This month the former US Special Envoy to Libya, Jonathan Winer said that Rome could take the lead in shaping a cohesive response to the Libyan crisis, bringing in the US, the UK and other western states in the process. 

Such a scenario is difficult to imagine. While Italy may well seek to play a larger role, forging a cohesive policy between different western states is not going to be easy. Aside from rare moments of coming together, for example at the Berlin Conference on Libya, such cohesion has proved elusive. It is also difficult to see Libya becoming a priority for many western countries. Creating a united response that will be capable of unravelling the complex problems facing Libya is going to be challenging at best. 

Italy is also not regarded as a neutral party by some Libyan constituencies. Meloni has reached out to the east, by visiting Haftar in Benghazi in May 2024, but her government has mainly concentrated on its relations with Tripoli and with Prime Minister Abdelhamid Dbeibah’s GNU. This is a function of the fact that western Libya is the source of Italian gas imports, as well as the main departure point for illegal migrants heading to the Italian island of Lampedusa. There is a perception in the east, however,  that Rome is legitimising and supporting Dbeibah. 

Furthermore, any Italian-led approach will need to contend with the role of regional players, and with that of Türkiye in particular. Ankara continues to be heavily entrenched in western Libya and is also making a notable effort to build its ties with the east, especially on the economic front where it has recently signed a raft of contracts in the construction and development fields. 

Türkiye realised some time ago that it needed to rebalance its relations with Libya and reach out to the eastern camp. It has channelled significant efforts into forging a relationship with the east, including with Haftar and his sons. At the end of October, Saddam Haftar attended the SAHA EXPO Defence and Aerospace Exhibition 2024 in Istanbul. While there he not only had a surprise walk-about in the company of GNU Interior Minister Emad Trabelsi, but also met officially with Turkish Defence Minister, Yaşar Güler, who received him in his capacity as the head of the LAAF’s land forces. 

Ankara therefore looks determined to play a larger role in Libya and to no longer be confined to Tripoli. As for the US, one should expect little significant change in the US approach. 

The November 2024 issue of Libya Focus also includes the following:

Politics

• Emad Trabelsi plans to set up ‘morality police’…
• Implications
• Presidency Council ups the stakes…
• High Council of State is still in disarray…
• Municipal elections are hailed as a great success…
• Trump’s election is unlikely to bring any real change to Libya… 
• Saddiq Haftar becomes more visible…

Security

• Trouble erupts in Yefren…
• Clashes over control of Hamada oil field

Energy & Economy

• The return of Mohamed Oun?