On 7 August elements of Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) deployed to the southwest which has significantly escalated tensions. Although supposedly aimed at countering threats from terrorist, criminal, and mercenary groups, the move is seen as a tactical territorial expansion.

The region surrounding the strategically important border town of Ghadames — to the south of the tri-border point where Libya, Algeria and Tunisia meet — has witnessed a surge in military activity in recent weeks. The Government of National Unity (GNU) affiliated Combat Brigade 444, led by the Military Intelligence head Mahmoud Hamza, made significant advances towards Ghadames which has raised concerns about a potential power shift in the area. Its actions are reportedly designed to counter the growing influence of Russian forces seeking to infiltrate the border region.

In response, Zintan’s Brigade 17 Border Guard, led by Mohamed Abdelnabi al-Zintani, mobilised its forces to prevent Combat Brigade 444 from gaining control of Ghadames and its airport. The situation was further enflamed by the fact that Zintani commander, Major-General Osama al-Juweili, who is Commander of the Western Mountains, began to mobilise in support of Abdelnabi al-Zintani and block Brigade 444. The closure of the Debdeb border crossing with Algeria underlined the severity of the situation and the complexity of securing the region. 

The LAAF’s deployment drew strong condemnation from the High Council of State (HCS) which warned of the potential collapse of the fragile ceasefire. The GNU responded by placing its Joint Operations Force and National Support Forces Authority on high alert.

Controlling Ghadames and its airport would provide a crucial platform for expanding the influence of Haftar’s LAAF and encircle western Libya from Sirte to the Algerian border including the currently disputed NC7 Hamada oil field development.

However, such assertions are exaggerated. Firstly, while Haftar would be keen to control Libya’s border with Algeria, such a strategic objective is beyond him. Secondly, al-Juweili does not work on behalf of Haftar. He has long had his differences with GNU Prime Minister Abdelhamid Dbeibah and he backed Fathi Bashagha, who the House of Representatives appointed as the head of its eastern-based parallel Government of National Stability (GNS). Al-Juweili went as far as to facilitate Bashagha’s failed May 2022 attempt to install himself in Tripoli. Yet while he is no fan of Dbeibah, he has also never been fully supportive of Haftar. Al-Juweili may have had loose temporary alliances with Haftar since 2011, but he also has his own problematic relationship with the LAAF’s General Commander. 

Furthermore, while al-Juweili may have been ousted from Tripoli in August 2022 by pro-Dbeibah forces, he did not entirely burn his bridges with the Tripoli camp and retained good relations with the Presidency Council. In December 2023, its head, Mohamed al-Menfi, asked al-Juweili to resume his duties as Commander of the Western Military Zone. He agreed to do so but the post was later changed to Commander of the Western Mountains Military Zone, after Major-General Saleh al-Namroush was made Commander of the Western Coast Military Zone. He also met the GNU’s Army Chief of Staff Lt-Gen Mohamed al-Haddad at this time. In July 2024 he was promoted by al-Menfi — in his capacity as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces — to the rank of Lieutenant General. 

Therefore, while al-Juweili still has a problematic relationship with Dbeibah, he is hardly in the pro-Haftar camp. Furthermore, he has no need to take control of Ghadames Airport because it is already under the control of a Zintani force to whom he is allied. This mobilisation and the escalating tensions should therefore be read in the context of efforts by Zintani forces, including those of al-Juweili, to block elements aligned with Dbeibah and the GNU from encroaching on their area of control. 

The potential consequences of a conflict in Ghadames are far-reaching. A full-scale confrontation could destabilise Libya and the wider Sahel region, especially considering the involvement of external players such as Russia and Algeria. The presence of these forces raises concerns about a potential escalation of the conflict, particularly in light of the Malian-Russian ethnic cleansing of the indigenous Tuareg in northern Mali. Russia’s Wagner Group, which is supporting the Bamako junta, has recently suffered a major military setback when it was ambushed and around 80 Russian mercenaries were killed (Algeria Politics & Security – 06.08.24). There have even been unverified reports that Russia has encouraged Hafter to take control of the Libya-Algeria border posts in order to punish Algiers for allegedly supporting the Tuareg and the rumoured but untrue claims of Ukrainian arms. 

The international community, including the UN and several Western countries, has expressed deep concern over the military mobilisation in the southwest which could spark a resumption of Libya’s civil war. The complex interplay of local, regional, and international factors in the Ghadames crisis underscores the urgent need for a comprehensive political solution to the Libyan conflict.