No-one can predict what will happen in Mali’s in the coming months but some of the factors which should be taken into considered are as follows:

There is a lot of civil and army opposition to the junta’s leader Assimi Goïta. A number of our local sources are saying that they would not be surprised if there were a coup before Christmas or early in the New Year.

Goïta is, however, pretty desperate to hold on to power because the International Criminal Court (ICC) is liable to bring charges against him within the next few months. This concerns the genocide his junta has perpetrated, with the Russians, against the ‘white-skinned’ Tuareg and Arabs in the north. Although the Tuareg are ‘taking’ the case to the ICC, they are not well organised despite having commissioned a 70,000 word report. Interestingly, the region’s main Islamist leader — the Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin(JNIM) leader Iyad ag Ghali — is also indicted by the ICC but it is unlikely either he or Goïta will get as far as The Hague.

Goïta’s Forces Armées Maliennes (FAMa) has recently been well reinforced with Chinese vehicles and armaments which look impressive for Mali. This may be China doing Russia a favour, although Beijing is becoming more proactive in Africa. Assuming that all the Chinese kit has been delivered, it could give the FAMa a little more confidence, and possibly even tip the scales. Eventually, however, much of this equipment will likely fall into Iyad’s hands.

Russia has increased its troop level in Mali to around 2,500 and maybe even more, rebranding the Wagner Group as the Africa Corps. The Russians may be more courageous in the south, but have had their fingers badly burnt in the north against the Tuareg fighters. Small drones are being used by the Tuareg to great effect which, along with courageous fighting, has brought about quite a lot of Russian losses. A few prisoners are also still being held in the North. It is unclear how the Russians will stand up to Iyad ag Ghali’s JNIM fighters, who are also pretty experienced fighters and very capable when it comes to guerilla tactics. The hatred of most Tuareg and Arabs in the North to the Malian state, and especially the current junta, should not be underestimated.

As for Iyad ag Ghali, he is the US$64,000 question. What are his objectives? He claims to want a Shar’ia state for Mali and is reported to be bargaining with the junta along the lines of allowing more fuel conveys in provided the state makes concessions over Sharia. He may be saying that, as are several analysts, and it may hold a grain of truth but it is not correct. Besides the fact that most Malians are Sufis and do not want hardline Shar’ia rule, Iyad is not as religious as he makes out. He used to be well known as a heavy whiskey drinker. Preachers from Pakistan talked him out of that many years ago but I am not so sure – leopards and spots!

He is also an extremely clever political operator, having fingers in just about every pie. He has always been a double agent for Algeria’s Département du Renseignement et de la Sécurité (DRS). Some, including myself, view him as a triple or quadruple agent, with ties to elements within the Mali state, France, the Emiratis, and others in the Middle East. So, are his ambitions religious or political? I believe they are more political and they may go beyond Mali, while using talk of Shar’ia as a pretext.

Iyad is also a VERY clever military tactician. He is currently keeping out of the desert areas because of drone surveillance and is instead concentrating his forces in the wooded areas in the south and therefore closer to the convoy routes from Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire etc.

Then there is also the key role of Algeria — the proverbial elephant in the room — which has always regarded northern Mali as it 49^th province, and with Iyad as its key DRS agent. Then there are Algeria’s key religious links to the Malian region. One reason why the Islamists were able to outdo the French was because Iyad and JNIM had protection from Algeria. 

Currently, however, the Algerian regime and army are heavily divided between its ties with Russia and pressure from Washington. It was the army under Chief of Staff, General Saïd Chengriha, who allowed the Wagner group to fly into Tamanrasset — masquerading as tourists — and then go on to Mali in 2021. However, there are strong rumours that the US has put pressure on the regime to allow small Ukrainian drones to be taken across Algeria to help the Tuareg fighters in the Kidal region fight the Russians. Algeria, which is in bad shape politically, is trying to ingratiate itself a little more with the Sahel’s juntas. However, because of misdemeanours over the last few years, that could be an uphill task. 

In conclusion, it is difficult to see Asima Goïta staying in power much longer. But who or what will take over, and how, is almost anyone’s guess. Unless, he is assassinated, and so far no one appears to have got near him, it is difficult to see Iyad coming out of all this as the loser. He’s been double-dealing and coming out on top since about 1988. And he is more powerful now — with an estimated 6,000 fighters under his command — than at any time in the past. 

Prof Jeremy Keenan