Last week, Algeria Politics & Security predicted that the dismissal of the DRS’ director Mohamed ‘Toufik’ Mediène  would see Algeria’s presidency seeking to give the impression of a brighter political future to come. We said that this could include tinkering with the constitution, and giving the impression that President Abdelaziz Bouteflika is planning to make the government more civilian and more inclusive of the political opposition.

Within five days of our prediction, a variety of sources (who claimed to be from within the presidency) appeared across the Algerian media to say that– unless there was any last minute change – the new constitution will soon be revealed and submitted to a public referendum to be held before the end of this year (2015).

Changes to the constitution have been described as being imminent at various stages since 2011, so their enactment after all this time would be significant. One source said that ‘the referendum will take place in November or December.’ With Toufik gone, said the source, the President is ‘more confident, more relaxed and more comfortable’ in launching his project. ‘The result of these reforms [getting rid of Mediène] means we can build the first steps of a civil state.’ The text of the new constitution, according to the same source, is scheduled to be revealed at the next meeting of the Council of Ministers, thought to be on 6 October.

However, we believe that such proposals are unlikely to be anything more than the same sort of talk seen since the beginning of 2011, and that little is likely to come of it.

President Bouteflika has claimed, at several junctures, that he wanted to reduce the power and influence of the security services in the political system. Even if Bouteflika tries, however, we think that he is unlikely to succeed. Beyond the issues around the president’s growing incapacitation, it is simply the case that the army will not accept exclusion from Algeria’s power structure, or a secondary role within it.

Over the past weeks, months, and years, the influence of the DRS within politics has been steadily and thoroughly eradicated. But as the role of the intelligence services has been weakened by the regime, that of the army has risen to become indispensable. The army is therefore well placed to take the DRS’ place as an unaccountable and pervasive influence beneath the surface of the regime’s political structures.

The capacity for civilian rule in Algeria has also been weakened by the dynamics of Bouteflika’s fourth term, and the legacy of the ‘Arab Spring’. Bouteflika’s latest term has consolidated those interests groups, notably big business and the army, which supported it. By doing so, it has prevented the emergence of an alternative or opposition political grouping that might realistically gain power.

This has been seen in the way in which new parties, such as Ali Benflis’ Talaiou El Houriyet (Vanguard of Freedoms) party and the CNLTD (Co-ordination nationale pour les libertés et la transition démocratique) opposition coalition, have done little more than fill column inches in the press since the presidential election of 17 April 2014.

The dismissal of Mediène was part of a political victory against a political opponent, and not the beginning of the establishment of the rule of law.