This month the Presidency Council began talking about appointing a military commander to become the ruler of Sirte.

This is in line with Misrata’s own assertion that it intends to appoint a military commander for the town. In early September, Mohamed Al- Gasri stated, ‘A military ruler will be entrusted for the area … The plan is already decided.’

Meanwhile reports from the front-lines suggest that Misratan fighters are already joking that the Islamic State of Sirte has become the Misratan State of Sirte. That Misrata should seek control of Sirte is hardly surprising, as doing so will expand its own influence and consolidate its power in central Libya.

The disadvantages will be deepening tensions and further obstacles to the prospect of a united army.

The residents of Sirte are also unlikely to react positively to Misratan control. While they may be grateful for the ouster of the Islamic State (IS) group, they still have bitter memories of Misratan fighters looting their town during the 2011 revolution to punish the inhabitants for their associations with the former Muammar Qadhafi regime. Trouble could be reignited once the thousands of Sirte residents who fled when IS took over start to return to their homes.

Any expansion of Misratan power is also going to antagonise Khalifa Haftar and his forces in eastern Libya – making a comprehensive peace deal an even more distant prospect.

Militarising Libya

The Presidency Council’s suggestion of a military commander to rule Sirte has also prompted concerns that Libya is being increasingly militarised.

The idea comes on the heels of announcements by Haftar’s forces that Abdulrazzak Al-Nazuri had been appointed as military governor of the eastern area – and that in Benghazi the work of the municipal council will be suspended and the deputy head of Haftar’s intelligence service, Colonel Ahmed Oraiabi, will take over the municipality.

In August, the Haftar camp defended the latter decision by arguing that it had been carried out in response to popular demand. It claimed that on-going divisions within the Benghazi municipal council were preventing it from providing services to the population.

Al-Nazuri explained, ‘The army intervened in order to save the municipality’ before going on to qualify, ‘This is not a return to military rule.’

While it is true that the Benghazi council is riven with factionalism, many Libyans interpreted the move as an attempt by Haftar to impose even greater military control over Benghazi. Some also interpreted Misrata’s call to appoint a military commander in Sirte as a direct response to al-Nazuri’s appointment in the east.

Concern that the country is being dragged back down the path of military rule and that civilian institutions will be further undermined appears justified.

Trouble brewing in the west

Western Libya has largely been relatively free of conflict over the past year or so, but trouble
appears to be brewing.

It was reported this month that Wissam Bin Hamid – the hard-line Islamist and former commander of the Benghazi-based Libya Shield 1 – is currently residing in Zawiya and is moving between the town and Sabratha in a bid to mobilise revolutionaries there to take up arms against their Zintani opponents once again. Bin Hamid is believed to be planning to use the revolutionaries to mount an attack on the Al-Watiya air base, which is controlled by the Zintanis.

It seems, too, that Bin Hamid may have been behind clashes that erupted in the middle of August between revolutionaries from Zawiya and another group from Wershefana. This prompted House of Representatives leader Aguila Saleh Issa to issue a decision on 21 August to establish a military operations chamber in Wershefana under the leadership of Colonel Omar Tantoush, who is the head of the Tribal Army.

Bin Hamid is also seemingly attempting to create an equivalent of the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (BRSC) in western Libya. In September, it was announced that a new military council had been established by 10 western Libyan towns, including Zawiya, comprising 1,500 fighters and 500 military vehicles.

This new council held a military parade on the main coastal road at Zawiya and announced that it was willing to work under the Government of National Accord (GNA). It also declared that it was awaiting instructions to join the GNA forces, although so far the Presidency Council has not responded.

It thus appears as though Bin Hamid has abandoned hope of revitalising the BRSC – especially following its recent failed suicide attack on the Labraq airport – and is now concentrating on pulling together a united force in western Libya that can offer a genuine challenge to the Zintanis.

This has created significant tensions in the west, and particularly in Zintan itself. In September, the town’s fighters consolidated their forces in Zliten, Jameel, and Raqdaleen, while the Abu Bakr Siddique Brigade, which that controls the Al-Watiya air base, issued warnings to anyone who dared to fly over the facility.

Libya could therefore see a return to violence in the west, although it would be likely to remain localised in and around the areas that are controlled by pro-Haftar forces from Zintan and Wershefana.

Intra-Islamist struggles

Tensions have also been riding high in Tripoli. In the middle of August, the powerful Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade – headed by the notorious Islamist commander Haitham Tajouri – attacked and took over the headquarters of the Libyan Intelligence Service in the Fornaj area of the capital.

The brigade declared that it would hand the building back only if the head of intelligence, Mustafa Noa, is replaced.

According to the Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade, Noa – who is from Misrata and is reportedly a former member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) – is ‘allying himself with extremists and providing them with weapons and money.’ It also accused the Libyan intelligence service of ‘spying for foreign bodies,’ and accused Noa in particular of spying for the Italians.

Such antagonism is mainly a result of the on-going power struggles in the capital that are indicative of the weakness of the GNA and the Presidency Council. More incidents of this type can therefore be expected.