On 29 June, ISIS leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi stunned the world by declaring an Islamic caliphate, or state, in ISIS-controlled territory in Iraq and Syria, with himself as caliph.
The declaration, footage of which was posted on YouTube and viewed more than 1.25 million times in the first two weeks, was certainly a dramatic performance. Al-Baghdadi, whose real name is Ibrahim Samarai and who was wearing a black turban to show that he is descended from the Hashemites, is seen calmly approaching the stage and greeting his supporters. He then sits and cleans his teeth with a miswak (twig used as a toothbrush and according to the hadith used regularly by the prophet) before making his speech.
The group of supporters is then seen pledging their baya (allegiance) to Al-Baghdadi as the new caliph.
In an audio recording, ISIS spokesman Abu Mohamed Al-Adnani is heard declaring, “The legality of all emirates, groups, states and organisations becomes null by the expansion of the caliph’s authority and the arrival of its troops to their areas… Listen to your caliph and obey him. Support your state, which grows every day.’’
Along with this declaration ISIS has pledged to drop the names Iraq and Sham from its name and on its official documents now refers to itself as the Islamic State.
No backlash yet
Yet for all that the cracks are beginning to show, whether ISIS’s behaviour will be enough to prompt these Sunni forces to turn against it is unclear. Although there were some reports this month of fighting between ISIS members and the Al-Tariqa Al-Naqashbandia, which is led by Saddam Hussein’s notorious deputy president Izzat Al-Douri, this does not appear to have been serious or sustained. So far there is little evidence of these divisions translating into any serious backlash against ISIS.
This is perhaps unsurprising. As long as Al-Maliki is attacking these Sunni forces there will be little space for differences to develop.
Yet, as noted above, a serious rupture between ISIS and these other Sunni forces, particularly the tribal ones, is Iraq’s only hope of freeing itself from ISIS’s grip. It is clear that the Iraqi army is not strong enough to defeat the militant force and that, while ISIS may not have the capacity to extend its reach any further, it is well entrenched in the areas it controls.
It is also clear that the US is reluctant to get directly involved. This is partly because it knows that attacking Sunni forces without a proper solution to the political equation would be counter-productive.
Bringing these Sunni tribes and forces on board to join the fight is the only way that ISIS can be pushed back, something that remains all but impossible so long as Al-Maliki remains in office.
