The Iraqi parliament’s vote on 2 November, which ruled that Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi cannot take any important decision without its consent, was nothing short of a mini coup against him. It has effectively broken his ability to take any independent actions, and it was a marked shift by a legislature which had initially appeared to support the prime minister’s reform package.

However, as Menas Associates’ Iraq & Kurdistan Focus publication explained at the time, this vote in favour of the reforms was not born out of any genuine support for al-Abadi or indeed his reform agenda. It was instead a response to public pressure and, more importantly, to the support that the Marjayia, the highest Shi’a religious authority in Iraq, was giving to the Prime Minister and his initiative at that time. But now that weeks have passed, and with al-Abadi struggling to implement his reforms in a systematic or efficient manner, MPs have seized on the opportunity to stop him in his tracks with this decision.

The parliamentarians have challenged al-Abadi’s agenda on the grounds that it is unconstitutional, that the prime minister has exceeded his authority, and that he is undertaking more general austerity reforms rather than those intended to root out corruption in particular. Yet despite all the complaints, some of which are more valid than others, there can be little illusion that the real reason behind the 2 November decision is self-interest. Indeed, these MPs are bent on putting a stop to al-Abadi’s reforms in order to protect their own interests and the interests of their political parties.

Equally concerning for Al-Abadi

Al-Abadi is losing the backing of those key constituencies that gave him the confidence to act in the first place.

The popular protests that originally prompted al-Abadi to propose the bold reforms are still ongoing, but aside from a hard core of committed activists they are losing their momentum. Iraqis are getting fed up with the slow pace of change and are frustrated that al-Abadi does not seem capable of pushing his reforms through to their conclusion. There is a growing feeling among some of the demonstrators, therefore, that al-Abadi is weak and unqualified to push the reforms through.

Some Iraqis complain that the demands made by the demonstrators are generalised in nature and change from week to week, sometimes focusing on political reform and other times on corruption.  In addition, despite the efforts of the organisers the demonstrations have retained their sectarian hue and in essence are Shi’a protests.

There are also signs that al-Abadi is losing the backing of the Marjaiya, whose support had given the prime minister the confidence to press on with what were extremely bold and controversial changes. The prime minister endured a major embarrassment this month when he went to Najaf in the hopes of having a meeting with Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani. However, he was snubbed and only managed to meet with some minor clerics.

Without the backing of the Marayia, al-Abadi is far easier prey for those political forces that want to drag him down. It also makes him an easier target for the Popular Mobilisation forces which, despite their broad resentment of the prime minister, would be reluctant to move against him as long as he retained the Grand Ayatollah’s support.