It is very unlikely that these big political players will leave the scene without a fight. Although, as explained above, they could not vote against the package, al-Maliki and others may well try to challenge the legality of their expulsion. They are also likely to obstruct al-Abadi at every turn.
There is a real fear that al-Maliki will take drastic and destructive measures to spoil al-Abadi’s chances of moving the country forward. As some Iraqi commentators have noted, al-Abadi should fear for his life. They have also pointed out that Brigade 56, which is in charge of security in the Green Zone, is close to al-Maliki.
Such concerns may be overplayed, but there is a danger that al-Abadi’s reforms initiative could develop into a major struggle between al-Abadi and al-Maliki. The former has sought to clarify that al-Abadi’s reforms are not targeted at any individual in particular, declaring at a press conference, “I fear some will try to direct my words towards one individual or another, against a certain group or organisation. I do not have anyone specifically in mind.” Yet no one can deny that getting rid of al-Maliki would be a major plus for the prime minister.
Moreover there is no guarantee that the popular mobilisation forces will take al-Abadi’s reforms lightly. Al-Abadi is clearly doing his utmost to neutralise these forces and ringfence them within the security arena. Al-Abadi stated, after his reforms were passed, “We should remove the popular mobilisation forces from the political field.”
For the time being these forces are unlikely to challenge al-Abadi directly. He has the Marjaiya on his side and these Shi’a volunteer forces still look to the Marjaiya as a supreme spiritual reference. However, trying to rein them in is still a risky move; they could turn against him at any time.
In addition al-Abadi will find himself up against others within the Shi’a camp. If he presses ahead with insisting that senior appointments should be based on merit he will come up against fierce resistance.
The various Shi’a parties and blocs have benefited spectacularly from the allocation system that enabled them to stuff senior posts with their people, with all the benefits this entailed. The support base of these parties depends on their being able to distribute posts and perks. If they can no longer do so their support is likely to dwindle fast.
The Sunnis and the Kurds have backed al-Abadi’s reforms programme but are not happy about al-Abadi’s push to end the allocation system, from which they have also benefited. The Sunnis are also not pleased that some of their political heavyweights such as Najayfi are included in the cull.
