As Iraq’s finances are corroded by low oil prices, its capability to achieve an effective political response is being debilitated by the weakness of its government.

The flaws in Iraq’s government are systemic, as Iraq’s democracy and its violence have combined to create a situation whereby power lies with numerous different factions, each often relying on their own armed groups for support. They are jealously protecting their shards of influence within Iraq’s fragmented leadership.

The lack of accountability inherent in this structure has spawned endemic corruption, while the need to please such a high number of competing interests means that the decisiveness that Iraq’s deteriorating situation requires cannot be reached.

Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi has already announced a campaign against corruption, but the culture of political impunity from which the corruption derives remains intact. Iraq’s factions soon rallied to ensure that Al-Abadi could take no meaningful action against their privileges.

Now, as Iraq & Kurdistan Focus reports, it is the factions themselves that Haider Al-Abadi is targeting. He wants to sweep them away, and to establish a technocratic administration in their place.

But with each group relying on their position in the government to draw money and power from Iraq’s shrivelling state, few are inclined to let go. Al-Abadi aims to compel them, relying on massive street demonstrations in Iraq and support from the highest Shi’a religious authority.

But the forces that he is encouraging have revolutionary implications and, given the abundance of weapons in Iraq and the deep political connections of many of the groups that hold them, the threat of upheaval means a threat of violence.

One element in Iraq’s volatile political composition that has, so far, come to Al-Abadi’s support is Moqtada Al-Sadr. As one indication of the complexity of the alliances involved, the Shi’a cleric, who established his credentials as a young militia leader during the US-led occupation, is now supporting a prime minister who is associated with greater sympathy to the US. Sensing an opportunity in the abundant popular outrage about the corruption of Iraq’s political elite at a time when the living standards of ordinary Iraqis plummet, Al-Sadr has placed his clout behind Al-Abadi.

Al-Sadr’s supporters held a colossal rally in Baghdad on Friday 26 February, attracting tens (and perhaps hundreds) of thousands of people. Addressing the crowd with slogans of ‘yes to reform’ and ‘no to corruption’, Al-Sadr reiterated his backing for the prime minister’s reform efforts while also issuing thinly-veiled threats that action was urgent and the costs of delay would be high. His warnings appeared to extend to the fate of the nation, the political class more generally, and Al-Abadi in particular.

The rally was impressive political theatre, and Al-Sadr’s threats were probably intended to give the prime minister reason to proceed with vigour, rather than providing an alibi for Al-Abadi’s deposition. But drumming up popular anger and demonstrations in Iraq is a high risk strategy when that anger runs so deep, and the prime minister risks losing control of the public outrage that he has encouraged if he fails to achieve results soon.

The challenges of Iraq’s future require decisive change, but the experiences of the past show that this will not be easy to achieve in a decisive way.