Iran’s complex domestic political scene is fully reflected in the registration process of presidential candidates that started on 11 April and culminated on the 15th.

While hundreds of nonentities usually register knowing that they don’t even qualify legally, the registration of the significant political figures is more telling. Some, such as former ministers, sign up to take advantage of free airtime during the campaign in order to present their views. Very few are genuinely hopeful of winning.

Ebrahim Raissi, who is the current custodian of the Holy Shrine of Imam Reza in Mashhad, has accepted a request to run by the so-called national assembly of the Popular Front of the Islamic Revolution Forces.

That entity published a final shortlist of candidates supported by the conservative factions, including former Tehran mayor Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, MP and former minister of education Hamid-Reza Haji Babaei, former MP Mehrdad Bazrpash, and former hardliner MP Alireza Zakani.

While it is not yet clear which candidates on the list will actually run for president, it is certain that Raissi will do so and thus be the main challenger to Hassan Rohani. Raissi is an appointee of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in his current role and a well-established cleric with close links to the more hard-line clerics in Qom and Mashad, such as Mesbah Yazdi and Alam-ol-Hoda (who is Raissi’s father-in-law). In addition to Raissi and probably a few lower ranked conservative candidates, former minister of culture Mostafa Mirsalim is likely to run. He has been nominated by the powerful Motalefeh Party – the entity representing the traditional merchant class.

Qalibaf also put forward his nomination in the final hours of registration on 15 April. His motive may have been to maintain his political standing either in order to become a member of Raissi’s cabinet or to be re-elected as mayor of Tehran by the new city council. For both positions, he will need to show a certain degree of popularity.

The Ahmadinejad camp

Former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad registered as a candidate on 12 April. He was accompanied by Hamid Baghai, another nominee, and Esfandiar Rahim-Mashaei, their close confidante.

Ahmadinejad’s move contradicted his earlier announcement that he would submit to the advice of the Supreme Leader and had ‘no plans to partake in the polls.’ Khamenei had advised Ahmadinejad not to run, saying his candidacy would ‘polarise’ the country prior to the elections.

Ahmadinejad’s justification for registering was that the election had already been polarised between Rohani and Raissi, and thus that his presence would break the polarisation and give voters a greater choice.

Prior to nominating himself, Ahmadinejad had endorsed Baghai, his former vice-president, as recently as 5 April.

One day after Ahmadinejad announced his candidacy, the Supreme Leader’s website published an old clip of a speech by Ayatollah Khamenei in which he refers to people who ‘deviate from the righteous path,’ stating that some people are initially on the right path and then become attracted to material values.

Observers have no doubt that this was a rebuke to Ahmadinejad, who seems to challenge Khamenei’s authority. It may be in fact that he wants to position himself as the ‘opposition candidate.’

The Khazali phenomenon

Former political prisoner and son of an arch-conservative cleric Mehdi Khazali has also signed up as a candidate. Khazali will most likely be rejected by the Guardian Council, but it is noteworthy that he has engaged in a campaign to question the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic.

He is a war veteran and close to some layers of state officialdom and to Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders. He has been leading the so-called Freedom Front.

He has asked his supporters to write his name on the ballot even if he is disqualified, in order to show to the regime that they cannot predetermine the election results.

The timeline

The nominations closed on 15 April, and the Interior Ministry will now check the qualifications of the candidates based on their education, political track record, and so on. Usually, a list of about 20 to 30 candidates is passed on to the Guardian Council for vetting.

The Guardian Council this time will have until 25 April to present the final list of candidates, which will almost certainly include Rohani, Raissi and Mirsalim. It is not clear whether Ahmadinejad and Baghai will also be on the list.

Some argue that Ahmadinejad has nominated himself to enter into a deal with the Guardian
Council, i.e., to secure the approval of Baghai before withdrawing from the race. It is also conceivable that both candidates will be rejected by the council.

The approved candidates will have time from 26 April to 17 May to campaign before a blackout period until 19 May. Results will be known on 20 May.

Alliances and positioning

Domestic analysts are concerned about Ahmadinejad’s plans. Some protests can be expected if both he and Baghai are both rejected, and that will generate tensions in an already tense domestic environment. If one of them is approved, we can expect a populist agenda of unrealistic promises such as a massive increase in cash hand-outs, job creation, and so forth.

Mirsalim will be a marginal player (similar to Ali Akbar Velayati in 2013), and the main competition will be between Rohani and Raissi. The attitude of Khamenei and his network towards both Ahmadinejad and Raissi will thus be an important factor in the process.

Mohammad Reza Aref, the head of the reformists’ Supreme Council for Policy Making, has officially announced his organisation’s support for the incumbent Rohani’s candidacy. This has consolidated Rohani’s position because reformists are capable of attracting a significant voter base.

First Vice-President Eshagh Jahangiri and Mohammad Hashemi, the younger brother of the late Ayatollah Rafsanjani, both put their names forward for candidacy just before the deadline. They both belong to the reformist/ moderate faction and have come forward to support Rohani in the election campaign, especially in television debates, so they may actually withdraw from the election prior to polling day.

Reformist support for Rohani will be complemented by centrist conservatives such as Majles Speaker Ali Larijani and his vocal deputy, MP Ali Motahari.

Although the reformists are not satisfied with Rohani’s performance in areas such as enhancing social freedoms or standing up to hard-line moves such as the recent arrest of journalists and civil society activists, they feel the need to continue the reformist–moderate coalition behind the president in order to increase his chances of re-election.

What about the voters?

Opinion polls and social media exchanges indicate mthat practical issues such as job creation and environmental protection are more important to the Iranian electorate than ideological issues such as women’s dress code.

Previous voter behaviour suggest three major categories of voters: regime supporters, reformists moderates, and undecided. Regime supporters amount to an estimated maximum of 7 million votes. The reformist/moderate base is put at a minimum 10 million votes and possibly as many as 15 million.

The rest of the electorate is undecided, but they more likely not to vote at all than to vote for Raissi or Ahmadinejad. It’s therefore important for Rohani to incentivise people to vote. A turnout of some 30 million would undoubtedly produce a majority vote for Rohani, whereas low voter turnout could create problems.

Because local council elections are also being held on 19 May, however, voter turnout is expected to be quite high.

And a new development on 14 April, might also generate a positive mood prior to the election and increase voter participation. The reformist press reported on a meeting between Khamenei, Rasool Montajabnia, and Mohsen Rahami. The latter two are leading reformist clerics closely affiliated with former Majles speaker Mehdi Karroubi.

The hour-long meeting took place only two days after Ahmadinejad signed up as a candidate and may be an attempt to reconcile Khamenei with the reformist faction. It may also signal that Khamenei is ready to release the leaders of the reformist movement, Karroubi, Mirhossein Moussavi, and Zahra Rahnavard. They have been under house arrest since 2011.

The meeting could also be a sign that the core factions – reformists, mainstream conservatives, and conservatives – are concerned about Ahmadinejad’s plans and wish to reconcile before any new tensions emerge in the course of the campaign.

The meeting has another significance in the light of recent rumours that Khamenei is badly ill. If the rumours are true, it makes sense that he would like to reconcile with the reformists in order to ease domestic tensions before the political establishment engages in debate about his succession.

Whatever the underlying reasons, we can expect new developments in Iran’s complex factional scene – and a very interesting election.