This is an excerpt from an article in our weekly Libya Politics & Security publication.

Early on 11 September — when Prime Minister Serraj was out of Libya celebrating Eid with his family for the week — General Khalifa Haftar launched Operation Sudden Lightning. This is a secret ground and air campaign to take over eastern oil terminals from PFG commander Ibrahim Jedhran. By mid-day, LNA forces claimed to be in control of Ras Lanuf and Es Sidra ports, with fighting over Zueitina, where Jedhran has reportedly been based for weeks, continuing. Jedhran had aligned himself with the GNA which, in theory, gave the latter access to large new sources of income after the 28 July agreement to resume exports from eastern terminals.

Earlier in the week, Haftar had met his commanders at Benina Airbase outside Benghazi, where it was reported he discussed progress in the fight against extremists in the city. By 11 September it was clear, however, that the campaign to recapture the oil ports was also discussed. Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) had targeted Ajdabiya, a strategic launching point for control over these terminals, since late 2015.

Recently, the LNA had tried to replace Ajdabiya’s mayor, Jedhran’s brother Salem Jedhran, with a military governor. It also appeared that Haftar co-opted the Jedhrans’ Magharba tribe in Ajdabiya before the offensive, ensuring they would not resist an advance. Late on 11 September the LNA was still facing resistance in Ajdabiya city itself despite the tribe calling for Jedhran to surrender.

Control over Libya’s oil has been the primary goal of most interest groups since the 2011 revolution, regardless of contemporary fault-lines or the presence of Islamic State (IS).

Fears that the oil infrastructure would be sucked into Libya’s growing conflict were fulfilled in mid-2014 when Jedhran blocked oil exports which he saw as benefiting what he perceived as a pro-Islamist government in Tripoli. Es Sidra port was then particularly heavily damaged during Operation Sunrise between Libya Dawn and Operation Dignity forces in early 2015. IS launched a number of attacks on oil ports and fields in 2015 and 2016 in order to weaken Libya’s governance. Various other interest groups have blocked the terminals in the past for their own idiosyncratic demands. It is therefore unsurprising that the next phase in Libya’s conflict will shift from a focus on eliminating extremist groups like IS to the internal fight for control of its oil.

Reacting to these events, the National Oil Corporation (NOC) met in Tripoli. NOC chairman Mustafa Sanalla has openly expressed his distrust for Jedhran, including after the 28 July deal, and the NOC statement hinted that it had expected these attacks for a long time, and had prepared countermeasures to prevent damage where possible. This is not proof of NOC complicity in Operation Sudden Lightning, but it does suggest that the NOC was anticipating Jedhran’s removal from the area. The precautions that NOC took have not prevented damage to the ports. Photographs circulated on 11 September show plumes of smoke over Es Sidra. The House responded late on 11 September by applauding the assault, echoing Sanalla’s previous complaints that Jedhran had cost Libya over US $100 billion by blocking the ports.

The Misratan response to this attack on GNA interests was muted, and the Presidency Council was relatively slow to release an official statement. There were reports late on 11 September, however, that the Presidency Council had called on Defence Minister Mahdi Al-Barghathi to organise a counter attack. Misratan militias either cannot, or will not, participate in immediate efforts to re-take the ports from Haftar. They have lost many fighters in Sirte and would be reluctant to take the risk of losing more fighters in the east. IS in Sirte also posed an existential threat to Misrata itself given its proximity and the probing attacks that IS undertook against Misrata from Sirte. By contrast the battle for the eastern ports is not an existential threat to Misrata, which could affect their decision to intervene.

The international community reacted to the attack by expressing its concern and lamenting that the event took place during Eid. It was too soon to determine, however, whether the US would support a potential counterattack with airstrikes. Any attempt by Haftar to export oil from these terminals on behalf of the eastern government is likely to be thwarted by the international community, citing UN Security Council Resolution 2278 which calls on member states to block illegal oil sales. The international community through the UN still recognises the Presidency Council and GNA as the legitimate government of Libya, even as Haftar and his allies do not.

The implications of this attack could be serious. With control over the eastern oil ports, Haftar would have the leverage that he needs to negotiate a more powerful position for himself in a new unity government. Many observers in western Libya feared that this was the first step in establishing a repressive government that would persecute the pro-Islamist factions. But, instead of provoking a resolution to the political conflict favouring Haftar, the attack could also make it more difficult to achieve any re-unification, because both the international community and pro-Islamist factions would feel even less trust for Haftar.

As a result of the attacks, any increase in popular support for the GNA after the successful battle against IS in Sirte could be negated. Only days earlier, Prime Minister Serraj had heralded the 28 July agreement as an important success for his government. That deal appears to have been undone by events on 11 September. Moreover, earlier last week, there had been positive reports about completed repairs to Ras Lanuf, which enabled its first exports for nearly two years. This slow progress will probably not now continue during the escalating fight over oil. With this offensive, oil exports may decline — even though the LNA has vowed not to interfere with oil production — which will prevent the GNA from gaining access to funds they need to improve the lives of most Libyans.