An extraordinary feature of the 25-27 July battle for the northern Malian border town of Tin Zaouatene (Algeria Politics & Security – 30.07.24 and 06.08.24) is that, while it has become the focus of widespread international implications, it is a taboo subject in Algeria itself 

For reasons explained below, Algeria is making little or no comment on the battle, while the silence from Tin Zaouatene itself is explained by the problems of communications. There are reports that the Forces Armées Maliennes (FAMa), still licking its wounds at military headquarters in Bamako, claims to have undertaken a reprisal attack near Tin Zaouatene against what it calls the ‘terrorists’ which is a term used to describe all of the junta’s real or perceived opponents irrespective of their ethnicity or attachment to actual jihadists terrorist groups. However, the attack — on which we have not yet received verification from the local population — seems to have been largely ineffectual.

On the wider international scene, Tin Zaouatene, has become a major concern and, in Algeria’s case, a central issue in a further deterioration in Algerian-Russian relations. 

The reason for this is the allegation, now seemingly established almost worldwide, that Ukraine played a key role in the battle. Algeria is also assumed to have played a part because no aid can reach Tin Zaouatene without passing through Algeria. The battle is therefore beginning to be seen as a proxy conflict in the Russian-Ukraine war. As we explained last week (Algeria Politics & Security – 06.08.24), however, there is no evidence of any Ukrainian involvement. Russia’s resounding defeat naturally seems to have been seized upon by Ukrainian propagandists and pro-government bloggers to cash in on Russia’s Saharan humiliation. The key element of apparent proof is a photograph — published in Kyiv on 29 July — of Azawadi fighters holding the Ukrainian flag alongside their own Azawad flag. However, as BBC Verify ascertained, this is a doctored fake image.

Currently, however, fake news can be more convenient and powerful than the truth. A number of Russia’s African allies — including its Sahelian satellites of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso — took action against Ukraine by expelling its few diplomats that have managed to establish themselves in Africa. Amongst Kyiv’s Western allies, Ukraine’s alleged role in the battle of Tin Zaouatene has been seized on without any regard to the veracity of the claims. 

Whilst simultaneously launching an attack into Russian territory, Tin Zaouatene is being widely quoted as an illustration of Ukraine’s expanding global reach and influence. Even a number of recognised African experts are seemingly paying no attention to the warnings from BBC’s Verify team, so it is unsurprising that the propaganda has become the largely established truth. Unsurprisingly, because Moscow also appears to believe the Ukrainian propaganda — possibly because it helps mask the incompetence of its hitherto much-vaunted Wagner Group (a.k.a. Africa Corps) mercenaries — it is angry, and is taking revenge on those countries, notably Algeria, which it believes may have assisted Ukraine.

For the best part of two years, and especially since last year’s rejection of Algeria’s application to join BRICS (Algeria Politics & Security – 29.08.23), bilateral relations with Russia have been declining. 

The past week has seen a further deterioration which hints at something more decisive than a mere drifting apart. Moscow is clearly determined to punish Algiers for its presumed but unproven pro-Ukrainian stance. It is alleged that the Kremlin’s latest threat has been to encourage Khalifa Haftar to move his Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) to the southwest Libyan town of Ghadames and seize the Debdeb border crossing with Algeria (see latest Libya blog). This was picked up by Morocco’s North Africa Post. On an Arabic language broadcast on Arabi 21, a reliable Algerian source also confirmed that Haftar had been encouraged by Moscow to capture Ghadames and seize the so-called Yassin border crossing as well. This is one of several unofficial crossings in the Zarzaitine region to the east of In Amenas, or, more likely, the Tarat or Tin Alkoum crossings further south in the Ghat region of southwest Libya. 

A further indication of this anger is that Russia’s UN Security Council representative openly clashed with Algeria by criticising its boxer, Imane Khelif, who won a gold medal at the Paris Olympics. Irrespective of the gender controversy surrounding her — initially instigated by the discredited Russian controlled International Boxing Association (IBA) which claimed last year that Khelif was one of two female boxers to have failed unspecified eligibility tests — the verbal clash at the UN was a first in bilateral relations. Algiers immediate response was to push thousands into the streets to celebrate despite having even banned demonstrations protests against the genocide in Gaza.

The wider implications of this growing bilateral rift are that it could lead, as the US is hoping, to major problems with the army which receives about 85% of its weapons and military training from Russia. A cessation in the supply of weapons and spare parts — either because the Ukraine war is overstretching Russia’s military production capacity, or simply as part of this latest rift in relations — could be the last straw for Algeria’s leading Russophile, General Saïd Chengriha, whose tenure as Chief of Army Staff is already on a knife-edge.