Libya’s Unity Government, recognised by the UN on 23 December after months of arduous negotiations, may be the best hope yet of resolving the standoff between two rival administrations that has underpinned the country’s war – but it faces an abundance of challenges.

International support will determine whether the Government of National Accord succeeds in the future, but the experience of how that government was born shows why the path ahead will not be easy. Menas Associates’ two Libya publications – Libya Focus and Libya Politics & Security – and their expert authors, explained this complicated process in simple terms:

11 July 2015: Some of the participants in Libya’s UN-backed political dialogue sign an agreement for how to form Libya’s unity government. But most of the support came from the House of Representative’s side. Its rival, the General National Congress, mostly refused rejected the deal. Libya Politics & Security observed that ‘partial acceptance may have been the best that could have hoped for under the circumstances’, but that Libya’s militias seemed ‘more ready for a fight than for peace.’  Fighting continued.

8 October 2015: In a bid to break the deadlock, the UN Special Envoy for Libya, Bernardino Leon, announces proposals for the shape of Libya’s unity government. He also suggests which individuals should hold its key offices. Libya’s loose coalitions appear to be fracturing as some on each side reject the deal, while others approve.

17 November 2015: Bernardino Leon is replaced as UN Special Envoy to Libya by Martin Kobler. The timing of the end of his term was an administrative matter, but leaks surrounding his email communications about employment in the UAE had damaged him and the dialogue process. Libya Politics & Security warned that ‘These emails will serve to undermine Leon’s credibility in Libya, and erode what little chance remained of him achieving a deal.’ Libya Focus felt that the ‘peace process has all but collapsed’.

5 December 2015: Elements from the House and the Congress, meeting in Tunis, announced the conclusion of a separate agreement between them. Its supporters included eastern Federalists, the hard-line Islamists. The agreement said that the House and the Congress would form joint committees to develop a new constitution and select a government. This ‘Libyan-Libyan’ deal was therefore a rival of both the UN peace process, and the Constitutional Assembly’s work to write a new constitution.  Libya Focus says that ‘this initiative is […]a red herring, and has little support beyond the immediate constituencies concerned.’ Libya Politics & Security called the signatories ‘a small, strange grouping of opponents to the UN-facilitated political dialogue.’

13 December 2015: World powers issue a communique, from their meeting in Rome, saying that they would recognise only a Government of National Accord agreed under the UN process as the ‘sole legitimate government of Libya’.

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17 December 2015: Members of both the House and the Congress sign the UN-backed peace proposal, known as the Libyan Political Agreement. It stated that a unity administration, the Government of National Accord (GNA) should be formed, consisting of a Presidency Council (of individuals named by the UN) that would choose a new cabinet. Fayez Al-Serraj was designated as Prime Minister of the GNA. But the agreement was signed by less than half of the House’s members, and only around a quarter of the Congress’, making the building of further support imperative.

Libya Focus warns ‘it is clear that the signing of the UNSMIL agreement marks a very definitive rupture in the Congress, which is even more fragmented than before. The House has yet to make an official decision on the agreement… it appears that those MPs who are opposed to the agreement are simply staying away to ensure that there is no risk that the House can vote in favour.’

23 December 2015: The UN Security Council unanimously passes Resolution 2259, in which it recognises the GNA as the sole legitimate government of Libya. It urged members to quickly provide support to the new government, particularly in terms of security, and threatened to impose sanctions on any Libyans impeding the new administration. Libya Politics & Security said that economic sanctions may have limited impact, and that ‘it may be better for the international community to do what is required to protect the GNA once it is installed in Tripoli, before calling on the GNA to finally cut off salaries to all spoilers and militias.’

4 January 2016: The Presidency Council of the new GNA holds its first meeting in Tunis, with a deadline to relocate to Tripoli by 17 January 2016. As well as ambiguous political backing within Libya, the loyalties of militias on the ground are deeply divided.  The international community hopes that, by giving its support and recognition to the government, more Libyans will rally behind it.

Libya Focus explains that ‘the international community is left with a dilemma. At the moment it appears to be pressing ahead regardless of the fact that neither the House nor the Congress has formally accepted the agreement. This is a risky strategy.’