By Saturday, 27 July it was clear that a major battle, fought over two-to-three days, had taken place in and around northern Mali’s Tin Zaouatene — literally on the other side of the oued (valley) to the Algerian town of the same name — in which the Malian army and its Russian allies suffered a major defeat. Some Russian reports claim that as many as 80 Russians may have been killed with others being taken prisoner.

The last two weeks have been tumultuous in northern Mali. On 16 July, a video of cannibalism — in which a Forces Armées Maliennes (FAMa) soldier is seen cutting up and preparing the heart, liver and other parts of a human body to eat — began widely circulating on the international media. The victim in the video — which is genuine — was identified as a Peul who was killed by the FAMa-Wagner forces in the Léré region last year. The Malian high command, which claims to be investigating the incident, has said that it was a one-off incident. This was clearly untrue because, in the following week, several other recent videos of cannibalism have emerged and been identified in terms of location and victims. These videos, which have also been proven genuine, have come-to-light following several months of genocidal actions by the FAMa-Wagner forces in northern Mali.

Then, on 22 July, the FAMa announced that a heavily armed column of FAMa-Wagner troops had captured the remote settlement of In-Afarak which is 122 kms northwest of Tessalit and less than 10 kms from the Algeria border. It claimed that In-Afarak was in the hands of armed rebel groups and traffickers. In fact, like In Khalil a little further south, In-Afarak was a key point in both legal and illegal trafficking from Algeria to Mauritania and for supplying the cities of Gao and Timbuktu further south. The location is very much part of the trafficking network that has been managed for many years by corrupt elements of the Algerian security services.

What happened in the following couple of days is unclear. The same column appears to have moved southeast, keeping parallel to the Algerian border, before arriving in the Abeibeira region. From there it moved into the Tin Zaouatene sector where it was ambushed and virtually destroyed by Tuareg fighters. Alternatively, it could have been a second column from the one that had attacked In-Afarak, which had moved north from Kidal to the Abeibeira region and then on to Tin Zaouatene. The former seems the most likely.

In the period between the attack on In-Afarak and the battle at Tin Zaouatene, Menas Associates had received photographs and videos of Algerian security services prohibiting the entry of civilian refugees from northern Mali into Algeria at Tin Zaouatene. This suggests that whatever decision Algeria made to intervene in the situation was probably only taken during the course of the FAMa-Wagner column’s move from the In Afarak region towards Tin Zaouatene.

The Russians claimed that they were overcome by a sandstorm which allowed some 1,000 Tuareg fighters to regroup. This is unconfirmed and may be part of Russia’s explanation for its heavy defeat. Also, the figure of 1,000 Tuareg (a.k.a. Azawadi) fighters seems to be an exaggeration. Whatever the truth, the column was ambushed and virtually destroyed in or near Tin Zaouatene. The Azawadians also claim to have shot down a FAMa helicopter in Kidal while the Malians claim that the helicopter crashed.

The number of FAMa-Wagner soldiers killed or taken prisoner is not yet clear. Initial reports said that 20 Russians were killed — including General Sergei Shevchenko — and possibly 17 FAMa soldiers. However other reports, including many from Russian sources, put the number of Russians killed at around 50, with some sites linked to the Wagner Group put the number at 80. One explanation for these discrepancies is that Iyad ag Ghali’s Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) issued a statement claiming sole responsibility for the battle. This is denied by the Tuareg rebels and is clearly untrue. It is quite possible, however, that the remains of the FAMa-Wagner column may have been attacked by JNIM fighters as it retreated south from Tin Zaouatene. This would explain the much higher numbers of Russians killed than those claimed by the Tuareg rebels at Tin Zaouatene.

Whatever the details, it is clear that Tin Zaouatene is the largest setback Russia’s forces have experienced in Africa. The implications for Moscow’s future strategy in Mali and the wider region are still unclear. One fear is that they will once again take revenge on the civilian populations.

The evidence from earlier engagements is that the Tuareg rebel fighters would have been unable to inflict so much damage on such a heavily armed column without external help. The many reports and photographs of the battle, as well as communications with some of the commanders, suggest that the Azawadis had somehow manged to acquire defence weaponry against the Turkish drones, which the FAMa-Wagner forces had been using so effectively in attacking them and the Kidal region’s civilian population. 

The key question is where such assistance might have come from. The only feasible possibility, on both geographical and political grounds, is Algeria. Well informed diplomatic sources believe that pressure from France and especially the US may have encouraged Algeria to intervene. The US has almost entirely been squeezed out of Africa and it is desperate to reverse the Russian presence and especially in the Sahel.

Algiers would almost certainly not have allowed either US or French weaponry to enter and cross the country. It would not need to do so because it certainly has sufficient weaponry, including anti-drone capabilities, to inflict such damage on a FAMa-Wagner column.

Pressure from either the US and/or France, may have encouraged Algiers to undertake a U-turn in its policy towards Moscow. It was already wavering badly following the humiliating 2023 rejection of its application to become a member of BRICS. The regime may have decided to give both Moscow and Mali a big slap in the face for their ignoring its warnings that it would not countenance their actions in Kidal, let alone the stationing Russian troops so close to the Algerian border. The recapture of Kidal was not in line with whatever agreement Algiers thought that it may have had with the Bamako junta. Moving such a heavily armed column — firstly to In-Afarak and then right into the Tin Zaouatene sector — was a step too far as far as Algeria was concerned. 

This decision which led to a prominent diplomatic source saying that Algeria had ‘finally done the right thing’, may also have been encouraged by the damage done to Army Chief of Staff, Army General Saïd Chengriha, by Toufik Bennacer’s secret revelations about Chengriha’s criminal activities (Algeria Politics & Security – 23.07.24). Whether this will lead to Chengriha’s earlier than expected ‘retirement’ — and especially with the current tensions within the army — is speculative. 

Meanwhile, the more precise details of what happened in the battle of Tin Zaouatene and its implications for Russia’s presence in both Mali and the wider Sahel, will become clearer over the next few weeks.