After several months of speculation, the east has given the clearest indication yet that it is not going to ratify the controversial maritime MoU that was signed between Turkey and the GNA in November 2019. For some time now, Ankara has been trying to capitalise on its rapprochement with Haftar and the LAAF to try to get the House to approve this agreement, which sets out Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) in the eastern Mediterranean. 

While it looked recently as though the east might be toying with the idea of going ahead and ratifying this MoU, doing so was always going to be problematic. Greece and the European Union (EU) have always refused to acknowledge the agreement as legitimate, with the European Council concluding at the end of June that the MoU ‘infringes upon the sovereign rights of third states, does not comply with the Law of the Sea and cannot produce any legal consequences for third states.’ Indeed, these EEZs cut across areas claimed by Greece and Cyprus. 

More importantly perhaps, Egypt – the LAAF’s closest regional ally – has stood firmly behind Greece and remained opposed to the MoU. Egypt, along with the LAAF, objected vehemently to the deal when it was signed. Despite Cairo’s improving relations with Ankara since that time, this maritime agreement is clearly a red line for Egypt. 

Cairo looks to have brought the eastern authorities in Libya around to the same viewpoint. On 9 December, Haftar visited Cairo, where it was agreed that Egypt and the eastern authorities would start delineating their maritime borders. This came a few days after Saleh visited Greece, where he met with the head of the Greek parliament, Nikitas Kaklamanis, and Greek Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis. His Greek hosts made it abundantly clear that they refused the maritime MoU and called on Saleh not to ratify the deal. Kaklamanis went further and demanded that the House annul the agreement.  

These demands upset Saleh’s two deputies. Indeed, the gap between him and his deputies shows no signs of narrowing after they issued a statement on 7 December accusing Greece of interfering in Libya’s internal affairs and asserting that Athens should respect Libya’s sovereignty. 

However, on 15 December, Saleh was unequivocal on the matter; in an interview with the Libyan News Agency, he said that the MoU was not valid because it had not been approved by the House. He also made the point that the government that signed the deal in 2019 lacked legislative confidence, and remarked that while he was not personally against the agreement, the matter needed to be studied by experts and presented to the ‘legitimate government’ – by which he was referring to the GNS in the east – before being referred to the House for approval. He made the point that such actions would only happen after ‘we have defined our borders and ensured that they are not violated by any of the neighbouring countries.’ In other words, Saleh has kicked the MoU into the long grass and made it clear that it will not be signed any time soon, if at all. 

His comments will have angered Ankara and will give rise to fears that the eastern authorities will prioritise striking a border demarcation deal with Egypt that may encroach on the EEZ delineated under the MoU. In an attempt to navigate a path between both Egypt and Turkey, Saleh called on 15 December for a dialogue that includes Libya, Turkey, Greece and Egypt in order for all these states to work out their maritime boundaries. Given the fractious relations between these states over this issue, such a dialogue is highly unlikely, and the issue will continue to cause major tensions.  

The December 2025 issue of Libya Focus also includes the following:

Politics

• Crowds call for presidential elections…
• Implications
• GNU announces imminent cabinet reshuffle… 
• UNSMIL launches ‘Structured Dialogue’…
• Saleh makes clear the House will not sign Turkish maritime deal…

Security

• Zawiya poses a problem…

Energy & Economy

• Suleiman issues warning to Dbeibah…
• Liquidity crisis persists…