Such a scenario raises the very serious question of whether Iraq can hold together or whether the divisions will run so deep that it will split into three separate regions. This crisis has certainly heralded more talk of a divided Iraq. As one Iraqi analyst noted this month, “What happened in Mosul turned the division of Iraq into a strong possibility.”
The situation has clearly left some Sunnis believing that a separate region is the only solution and would be preferable to another four years with Al-Maliki in power. The Kurds are also pushing for such an outcome, seeing a separate Sunni region as giving succour to their own bid to be free of the centre. Some Shi’as are also in favour, viewing it as the only viable future for a such a divided Iraq. However, such talk is still somewhat hasty. It is true that the country appears more divided than ever.
But one should remember that the vast majority of Arab Iraqis, whether Shi’a or Sunni, still fiercely reject the idea of the break-up of Iraq. There is still strong symbolic and sentimental attachment to the idea of Iraq as a single state and federalism continues to be associated in the minds of many Iraqis with colonial plots to divide and rule.
As for the Kurds, they are the most explicit about their desire for an independent Kurdistan. Massoud Barazani met US secretary of state John Kerry on 24 June and is reported to have told him that the Kurds intended to declare independence and that the US had to understand the reality of that. Barazani told Kerry bluntly, “We are facing a new reality and a new Iraq.”
However, Barazani left the door open for an alternative trajectory, also reportedly telling Kerry that the only way to keep Iraq united was to change the way of ruling. Some Kurds also still have a strong attachment to being part of Iraq and view an independent Kurdish state as something for the future, not for now. It is difficult to assess the extent to which these calls for independence are related to the Kurds’ desire to improve their bargaining position vis-à-vis Baghdad.
Mitigating factors
On top of this general resistance to the idea of a divided Iraq there are several important factors that are likely to mitigate against the country being broken up.
First, the city of Baghdad remains problematic. While there are clearly defined Kurdish, Shi’a and Sunni areas, the capital is a large melting pot that will not sit easily within any of the regions and that many Iraqis, but particularly the Sunnis and the Shi’as, would be unwilling to relinquish. Thus the position of Baghdad would prove extremely problematic and could provoke serious conflict.
Second, many of the Sunni forces now fighting reject the idea of a Sunni region. Many of them, the Sunni tribes in particular, are for the most part nationalist and would reject the idea of breaking the country up. For its part, ISIS is not interested in a Sunni region comprising Diyala, Salehedinne and Al-Anbar. ISIS’s ambitions go far wider and are linked to the aspiration to create an Islamic caliphate that extends across the region. This is an ambition that does not sit comfortably with most of the other forces fighting alongside ISIS. Even the other militant Islamist groups have a far more localised agenda.
In addition, these forces are not cohesive. While they might have come together to struggle against Al-Maliki, there is little love between them and it won’t be long before their differences come to the surface. In particular there is a wide gulf between ISIS and the other forces, many of which consider ISIS a terrorist outfit.
ISIS has already angered some of these other forces by its insistence on trying to dominate. After taking Mosul the group called on scholars, elders and tribal sheikhs in Ninevah to swear allegiance to its leaders. Such militant groups are not known for their willingness to compromise and ISIS clearly sees itself as the only legitimate force, to which it expects others to submit. On 13 June it issued a statement warning all those who took part with it against Al-Maliki that they are not to disobey. The statement also asserted that all the spoils of war can only be the responsibility of the group’s emir, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi Al-Kurshi.
Al-Kurshi also issued orders to destroy all graves and religious shrines in Ninevah and he also banned alcohol and smoking. The emir called on all girls and women in Mosul to wear the jilbab and not to leave home. The statement ended by declaring, “This is the time of the Islamic state and its emir.”
Such actions do little to endear the group to either the local population or those forces fighting alongside it. It seems likely that differences between these forces will soon emerge and could well become violent. It is difficult to see how these different forces could come together to agree to form a separate region of their own and without meeting strong resistance from within the Sunni governorates.
As for the Shi’as, it is true that they are more cohesive and that, given the distribution of Iraq’s oil reserves, they would be in a stronger position than the Sunnis to go it alone as a separate region. However, this does not mean that there aren’t real differences between the various Shi’a players that would mitigate against forming a region. More importantly, perhaps, Iran is strongly opposed.
External pressures
Lastly, there is strong external pressure against the country breaking up. As well as Iran, other regional powers have made it clear they oppose this. This includes Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Although Turkey is supporting Iraq’s Sunnis, it fears having an ISIS-controlled region close to its borders. The kidnapping of its diplomats and a number of special forces operatives by ISIS forces from the Turkish consulate in Mosul during the assault on the city was certainly a sobering experience for the Turks.
Thus, even though Ankara desires the fall of Al-Maliki, it does not want to see a divided Iraq. Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan made this abundantly clear during the visit by Kurdish prime minister Nejervan Barazani this month. Erdogan issued a statement expressing his concerns over stability and security in the region and declaring that the only way to overcome the crisis in Iraq and to maintain territorial integrity was to establish an inclusive government bringing together all components. Thus, although a spokesman for Turkey’s ruling Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP), Huseyin Celik, told the Financial Times at the end of June that “in the past an independent Kurdish state was a reason for war [for Turkey] but no one has the right to say this now”, the official Turkish line is still a preference for a united Iraq.
The US is also firmly against a divided Iraq. The break-up of Iraq will therefore be met with strong external as well as internal resistance.
